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In his first year at Cambridge to study for a Ph.D. in economics, Geoff 
Harcourt locked himself away for the better part of a term from friends, family 
and the temptations of Cambridge to read and study Joan Robinson's newly 
published The Accumulation of Capital ( 1956). He later testified that 
The Accumulation of Capital had a profound effect on me. It presented 
a 'vision' of how capitalism works over time and, more tentatively, a 
conceptual framework with which to think about the processes involved 
and which made sense of what I saw happening around me. It formed 
the core from which my own work and teaching was from then on 
always to start. 
(Harcourt 1992: 3) 
He went on to add that one of the great virtues of Robinson's work was that 
she was able to synthesize the work of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, Marshall, 
Keynes, Kalecki, Kahn and, in her later work, Sraffa. The history of economic 
thought, seen through this Robinsonian lens, would form the backdrop for 
Harcourt's own thinking and many contributions to post-Keynesian theories 
of investment, pricing, employment and the distribution of income. It was also 
from this Robinsonian perspective that Harcourt wrote and continues to write 
the history of post-Keynesian economic thought, covering the Cambridge 
capital controversy, the post-Keynesian revival of classical political economy, 
contemporary post-Keynesian theory, and finally the history of ·Joan 
Robinson and her circle'. 
It seems fair to say that no one has approached Harcourt's facility and 
insight in explaining how the different strands of post-Kcynesianism weave 
together to produce a distinct and identifiable modem form of economic 
analysis and thinking. His advantage in this has in part been due to his having 
been at Cambridge at the time of the initial emergence of post-Keynesianism 
in the 1950s when it first began to become clear that Keynes's own thinking 
- as opposed to hybrid Keynesianism of the Samuelsonian sort - would not, 
and perhaps could not, be widely accepted by an economics profession 
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fundamentally conservative in nature. Led by Robinson, Kahn, Kaldor and 
Sraffa. Cambridge then began to train a new generation of economists who 
were conscious of the fact that they were producing theory following new 
pathways. though with origins more than a century old in classical political 
economy. Harcourt was a member of this new generation; a member, as he 
puts it, of the class of 1955-8. But Harcourt's advantage in explaining post-
Keynesianism and its history is also due to his talent as a historian of ideas, 
which has enabled him to survey the structure and significance of contempo-
rary economic ideas, especially in their relation to the issues facing modern 
economies. It was this that enabled him to make his initial foray into the 
history of thought in his definitive and unequalled history of the Cambridge 
capital controversy. Writing the history of the debate practically as fast as it 
happened, Harcourt demonstrated a gift in grasping the present as history. 
This chapter outlines· Harcourt's contributions to the history of post-
Keynesian economics both to draw attention to the scope of his 
achievements as a historian of ideas, and to help explain the nature of 
post-Keynesianism itself. It is important to understand the latter objective 
to appreciate the former. Post-Keynesianism's different currents sometimes 
create the impression that the term 'post-Keynesian' lacks an identifiable 
referent. Post-Keynesian economics may none the less be identified as the 
product of a succession or accumulation . of theoretical innovations in 
~conomics aimed at helping us understand modern industria1, monetary 
economies. Harcourt has focused upon the quarter-century history of the 
emergence of post-Keynesianism at Cambridge influenced most by Keynes, 
Sraffa and Kalecki. That history was first told in terms of the Cambridge 
capital controversy (see below), was next deepened through discussion of 
the post-Keynesian revival of classical political economy traditions (the 
subject of a section starting on p. 448), was then broadened by a gathering 
of related movements in the identification of post-Keynesianism as an 
approach and method (see p. 450), and is currently being re-examined from 
the perspective of the original contributions of ·Joan Robinson and her 
circle' (p. 452). · 
THE HISTORY OF THE CAMBRIDGE CAPITAL 
CONTROVERSY 
The Cambridge capital controversies had their origin in Robinson's critique 
of the aggregate production function (1953-4), drew inspiration from Sraffa's 
classic work ( 1960), and climaxed in the res witching and capital-reversing 
debates of 1965-7. The controversies surely represent one of the more 
paradoxical episodes in the history of economic thought. Two different groups 
of some of the world's best-known and talented economists representing two 
different long-standing traditions in the history of economic thought engaged 
in a protracted, intense intellectual exchange for nearly ten years over one of 
445 
JOHN B. DAVIS 
the most important issues in economic theory and in capitalism, but none the 
less largely misunderstood one another, often failing to communicate at all, 
with the result that though the debates arguably produced a reasonably clear 
set of conclusions, few economists today either recognize their importance or 
grasp their implications for current economic theory. Indeed, many of the 
participants in the debates confined themselves to citing the errors of their 
opponents. Harcourt. however, drew valuable conclusions about the sig-
nificance of the debates for post-Keynesian economic thinking and economics 
generally. 
The lack of communication and misunderstanding between the two 
Cambridgcs was in good part due to the fact that the Cambridge, England, 
critique of marginal productivity theory specifically targeted the aggregate 
production function. One response from Cambridge, Massachusetts, was that 
this did not preclude consideration of the marginal products of individual 
capital goods, and thus that no serious critique of marginal productivity theory 
was involved. Throughout the later debates over reswitching and capital 
reversing, this point remained unresolved, with Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
insisting more and more as the flaws of aggregate production function 
thinking became apparent that marginal productivity theory had its principal 
home in general equilibrium analysis, and Cambridge, England, insisting that 
aggregate analysis was central to any understanding of the economy as a 
whole. 
What explained this breakdown in communication between the two sides? 
Harcourt drew on Robinson, who had argued that the problem was not about 
the measurement of capital but rather about its meaning, where this involved 
specifying the nature of a capitalist economy in terms of its institutions and 
rules, one of which would presumably be that in a system in which one class 
owned the means of production, a uniform rate of profits had to be paid on 
all capital goods. Harcourt thus commented in his 1976 'Cambridge 
controversies' review of the debates: 
What is involved is the relevant 'vision• of the economic system and the 
historical processes associated with its development. In particular, stress 
is laid by the Cambridge (England) school on production and distribu-
tion as involving underlying social relations, especially their implication 
for production and distribution, accumulation and growth. 
(Harcourt 1992: 133) 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, however, insisted, in the words of Frank Hahn, 
that what all one needed to do, or could do, was 'to get the purely technical 
argument right' (Hahn 1972: 2; quoted in Harcourt 1992: 132). Importantly, 
this presupposed that in the social sciences ideology and analysis could be 
easily and clearly separated. a proposition that Cambridge, England, follow-
ing the lead of Dobb 1973: 4-7), firmly rejected. This methodological 
disagreement, Harcourt recognized, had concrete implications for the prog-
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ress of the debates. Because Cambridge, Massachusetts, believed that 
ideology and analysis could and ought to be kept separate, it came to conclude 
that the unwillingness of Cambridge, England, to keep them separate 
demonstrated an ideological rather than scientific motivation. This ultimately 
also justified the attitude that ultimately many assumed in the Cambridge. 
Massachusetts, tradition toward the debates, namely. that they had never 
involved a truly scientific exchange, and ought accordingly to be ignored -
along with. for that matter, all the thinking associated with Cambridge, 
England. 
The effect on Cambridge, England, and the future of post-Keynesian 
thinking was decisive. Whereas once in the respectably scientific and highly 
influential tradition of Keynes, the thinking of Cambridge, England, abruptly 
became outcast in the mid- l 970s, its ideas increasingly proscribed from the 
economics curricula of major universities, first in the United States and then 
gradually elsewhere, on the supposed but largely unexamined grounds that it 
was methodologically corrupt and unscientific. 1 This could not but have 
surprised Cambridge, England, economists, who had not only correctly 
identified important flaws in marginal productivity thinking as an account of 
the modem industrial economy only to have them disregarded, but who had 
had good reasons worth discussion rather than simple dismissal for maintain-
ing the connectedness of ideology and analysis. Post-Keynesianism, then, 
fiTst emerged as a distinct form of economics as a result of these develop-
ments, in that its body of theoretical and methodological assumptions 
acquired an inadvertent unity and relative autonomy by virtue of their outcast 
status. Subsequent development of post-Keynesian thinking. then. not only 
built upon the theoretical foundations established by Cambridge, England, in 
the debates, but did so with an awareness of the importance of the 
methodological positions involved. One of Harcourt's most important 
judgements regarding the Cambridge controversies emphasized this latter 
point. 
Although lack of communication and misunderstanding characterized 
much of the debates between the two Cambridges, their most ironic aspect, 
Harcourt concluded. was that their 'climax itself was not very satisfying, 
because it occurred in the wrong - or at least not in the most important 
or fundamental - areas' (1992: 130). Were one to suppose that the Arrow 
and Hahn general equilibrium theory was the only viable form of marginal 
productivity theory, 
the sorts of questions that the classical political economists were 
attempting to answer, in particular, the determination of relative shares 
of profits and wages as capital goods accumulate over time. and what 
happens to the living standards of broad class groupings, to the rate of 
profits (the uniform, long-run, natural or normal rate of profits, that is) 
and to the techniques of production in the process - broad, aggregative, 
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sociological questions associated with the 'laws of motion' of capitalist 
societies - would end up unaddressed 
(ibid.: 135) 
One reason for this, Harcourt explained, is that general equilibrium theory is 
'not explanatory ... nor a descriptive hypothesis, principally because it cannot 
handle historical time' (ibid.: 136). Throughout the capital controversies 
Robinson had always insisted that at root in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
thinking was 'an error in methodology - a confusion between comparisons of 
imagined equilibrium positions and a process of accumulation going on 
through history• (Robinson 1974: 11). Real-world economies did not operate 
in logical time, however, but through causal processes in historical time. 
The Keynesian method is to describe a set of relationships (intended to 
correspond ... to the relevant features of the economic system) and to 
trace the effects in the immediate and further future of a change taking 
place as an event at the moment of time. 
(Robinson 1975: 92) 
That there was no conununication on this issue, Harcourt saw. meant that 
there could be no resolution of the many different points in contention 
between the two Cambridges. The particular effect this had on the future 
development of post-Kcyncsianism, however, was for Cambridge, England, 
economists to grasp clearly that economic methodology required attention to 
real, causal, historical processes, which created a basis for investigation of 
those ·broad, aggregative, sociological questions associated with the "laws of 
motion", of capitalist societies' investigated in classical political economy. 
This meant that early post-Keynesians next set out to re-explore and revive 
the assumptions of that mode of thinking. 
THE REVIVAL OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
Harcourt's most important contribution in this regard was his 1975 Economic 
Record review essay of four books (Harcourt 1975a), Dobb's Theories of 
Value and Distribution (1973), Hahn's The Share of Wages in the National 
Income (1972), Hicks's Capital and Time (1973) and Johnson's The Theory 
of Income Distribution (1973). Dobb (1975), Hahn (1975) and Hicks (1975) 
later responded to the review, and Harcourt (1975b) replied to their 
comments.2 His initial premise was that each of the four was essentially 
·concerned with the great problems of the classical political economists -
distribution and the theory of value, allied with the process of accumulation 
of capital goods over time in a decentralized economy, usually competitive, 
capitalist economy' {Harcourt 1992: 101). What distinguished the four 
authors, however, was the prominence or neglect each accorded distribution 
448 
HARCOURT AS A HISTORIAN OF THOUGHT 
and production, and specifically, whether one held to 'the dependence of the 
price structure on distribution', or favoured 'the converse dependence of 
distribution on a demand-determined price-structure' (Dobb 1973: 266; 
quoted in Harcourt 1992: 112). Here Harcourt found invaluable Dobb's 
understancling of the history of economic thought in terms of two competing 
traditions, which differently conceived the relationship between analysis and 
ideology. and which disagreed on the scope of political economy. These issues 
linked to the question of whether one reasoned in terms of universal general 
laws, or adopted a historical-relativist position which emphasized institutions 
and time. 
For Harcourt, Hahn represented an interesting case on account of his 
employing a simultaneous-equations methodology to add an account of the 
distribution of income to Keynesian analysis of overall economic activity. In 
response to Harcourt's charge that this ran counter to Keynes's and Kalecki's 
emphasis upon the idea of a one-way process of direction from investment to 
savings, Hahn reasserted the themes of mathematical mutual dependence, 
suggesting in the process that post-Keynesian economists were guilty of the 
most incomprehensible mistakes in reasoning. A better example of Dobb' s 
thesis of two competing (and non-communicating) traditions in economic 
thinking might not be found. As Harcourt noted in his reply. the real problem 
here seemed to be that post-Keynesians were concerned with classical 
questions - accumulation over time, the distribution of income between 
classes, the role of a uniform natural rate of profits in a capitalist economy -
which were matters that modern general equilibrium theory was never 
intended to address. 'Hahn has ignored the criticism that the wrong approach 
may have been used to model the world for particular questions' (Harcourt 
1992: 126), and this meant that misunderstanding and lack of communication 
were likely to prevail. 
Hicks, interestingly, took the occasion of his comment to emphasize the 
historical methodology intentionally applied in his later work generally, a 
feature which he believed Harcourt had not appreciated in reviewing Capital 
and Time, and which he allowed was missing from his earlier, better-known 
work. Given this, he then argued that economies out of equilibrium may none 
the less be understood to converge to equilibrium when certain simplifying 
assumptions are adopted. One of Harcourt's original concerns was which such 
simplifying assumptions might justifiably be made, specifically regarding 
whether wages are fixed or variable, when one was trying to understand the 
role of the surplus in modem economies; But Hicks's view of history required 
an equilibrium concept. It was an excellent example of a framing concept that 
Dobb would term ideological. 
Interestingly, after Dobb's book had appeared. Hutchinson (1974) had 
argued that Dobb was wrongheaded in attempting to justify a role for 
'individual motivation' in economic analysis. Dobb thus replied in his 
comment that his emphasis on ideology rather concerned 'the extent to which 
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the shaping of any model, or set of abstract propositions in a subject ... is 
inevitably influenced . . . by what may be termed a larger conceptual 
framework of ideas about the nature of existing society and its history' 
(quoted in Harcourt 1992: 118). This restatement of Dobb's view was 
seconded by Harcourt in his own reply. It reflected his recent experience over 
the reception to his comments on ideology in his book on the capital 
controversies (Harcourt, 1972), where it was clear that there was very little 
sympathy for considering any possible role the concept of ideology might 
have in theoretical disputes. It may also have been behind Johnson's 
unwillingness even to reply to Harcourt's original review on the grounds that 
Johnson thought that Harcourt simply did not like his book- an interpretation 
of ideological differences reduced to personal motivation. 
Thus again, not only did deep-seated differences divide economists from 
different traditions, but individuals from these traditions were also unable to 
communicate about fundamental methodological issues. The great virtue of 
the exchange that came out of Harcourt's Economic Record review essay. 
however, was to make clear that there were these very different traditions, that 
post-Keynesianism with its interest in the 'broad, aggregative sociological 
questions' facing economies had natural roots in classical political economy, 
and that there was unlikely to be much overlap of interest between post-
Kcyncsianism and the economics of Hahn, Hicks and Johnson. What needed 
to be done, then, was to map out the distinctive contours of this tradition with 
its classical political economy antecedents in its contemporary development 
in connection with modern industrial economies. 
THE BROADENING OF POST-KEYNESIANISM AS A 
DISTINCTIVE TRADITION 
In an often-cited paper, (Hamouda and Harcourt 1988), Harcourt turned to the 
task of explaining the nature of post-Keynesianismper se (see also Harcourt 
1982). Despite the many papers already on the subject. the controversial 
character of the issues, the diversity of theories and the ideological suspicions 
of many in the economics profession still left it unclear to many just what 
post-Keynesianism involved. Harcourt, however, chose to explain post-
Keynesianism as a single approach according to the different routes by which 
it had come out of classical political economy. He discerned three strands of 
thinking distinguishing major groups of thinkers, and also identified a 
collection of outstanding individual figures who defied classification within 
any one strand. Emphasizing the continuity with classical political economy 
made the surplus approach central to theories of value and distribution. The 
classicals had also sought an analysis of gravilational natural prices rather 
than supply-and-demand market prices, and treated money as a veil via the 
quantity theory over a real economy governed by Say's Jaw. Clearly, these 
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basic ideas allowed for different elaborations in the context of modem 
industrial economies. 
One strand led to Marshall. Marshall preserved the classical dichotomy 
between value and distribution, on the one hand, and money, on the other 
(though abandoning surplus thinking by explaining long-period normal prices 
in terms of supply and demand). Keynes pursued the money side of this 
classical vision and, though retaining the classical emphasis on broad, 
sociological relationships, ended up throwing over the quantity theory, Say's 
law and the classical dichotomy for an analysis of a monetary production 
economy. North American post-Kcyncsianism (Weintraub, Tarshis, Davidsont 
Minsky) took up this conception, and added an account of the aggregate 
supply function. The latter took firm price or sales proceeds expectations 
(according to the form of competition assumed) as a starting point, and 
investigated how entrepreneurs would react if these short-period expectations 
went unfulfilled. Analysis of the economy as a monetary production economy 
emphasized uncertainty, the centrality of the money wage, the properties of 
money liquidity, and financial instability. 
A second strand of post-Keynesianism. a neo-Ricardian one, derives from 
Sraffa' s rehabilitation of the surplus approach, emphasizes the importance of 
a long-period approach to income and employment, and firmly rejects any 
elements of a subjective theory of value. Sraffa' s work laid the basis for the 
critique of aggregate production function analysis central to the Cambridge 
capital controversies. It also led to important disagreements with those post-
Keynesians attached to Keynes's downward-sloping marginal efficiency of 
capital and investment schedules, which were regarded as inconsistent with 
the main results of the capital theory debates. This conflict suggested to some 
that nco-Ricardian economics was fundamentally different in nature from 
other strands of post-Keynesianism. Putting aside questions of semantics, 
Harcourt·s strategy was to show that in terms of Dobb's two competing 
traditions, neo-Ricardianism and monetary production post-Keynesianism 
none the less shared the same classical heritage. 
The third strand Harcourt distinguishes passes through Marxian econ-
omics, stressing the significance of social relationships in the sphere of 
production. the technical structure of production, and the potential surplus 
available at any moment of time. The real wage is determined in class conflict, 
and whether the potential surplus is realized depends upon the interplay 
between an accumulation function (in the sense of Robinson's 'animal spirits' 
function) and a savings function reflecting the distribution of income. Kalecki 
was especia11y influential here in combining Keynes's effective-demand 
analysis and Marx's reproduction schemes. Robinson represented the two-
sided relationship between accumulation and profitability with her famous 
banana diagram. The micro-foundations of the approach were developed from 
Kalecki's degree of monopoly mark-up view by a variety of individuals. 
Contributors have none the less differed over the relative importance of long-
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run and short-run factors in explaining price-setting. 
Finally, Harcourt takes Kaldor, Goodwin, Pasinetti, Shackle and Godley to 
be beyond classification. Yet all share classical presuppositions in their work, 
and are consequently labelled post-Keynesian. Harcourt's survey of post-
Kcynesianism, then, demonstrates the existence of a shared orientation across 
very different types of thinkers based on their common concern with 
'concrete situations, the historical experience and the sociological character-
istics of the economies' they study (Hamouda and Harcourt 1988: 231). All, 
it might be said, sought to fit theories to the facts they found rather than fit 
facts to pre-held theories - a formalist trait characteristic for Dobb of the other 
great tradition in economics that emerged after classical political economy. 
Given this distinction, to attempt to place all types of post-Keynesian thinking 
in a single schema is a misplaced exercise. Different levels of abstraction and 
different issues necessarily produce different types of theories. This methodo-
logical conviction is specifically post-Keynesian. 
'JOAN ROBINSON AND HER CIRCLE' 
Harcourt·s largest and most recent project in writing the history of post-
Keynesian economic thought involves explaining the thought of 'Joan 
Robinson and her circle', t11e first economists who were self-consciously post-
Keynesian. Robinson, Kahn, Kaldor and Sraffa were not only the first to see 
that Keynes's and Kalecki's work departed in fundamental ways from 
Marshallian thinking, but also to see that it did so by reintroducing classical 
questions and concerns into modem economics. They were also the first to see 
that new divisions within the economics profession - initially brought about 
by Keynes's rejection of Say's law and the quantity theory of money, and then 
over the competing conceptions of the proper domain of economics produced 
in the Cambridge capital controversy - were likely to persist in the future. 
Of course Harcourt's choice of Robinson as the central figure in this group 
naturally reflects his own commitments and interests in economics. Other 
post-Keyne_sians accord Sraffa greater importance (or Kalecki for that matter, 
though he was not really part of the post-Keynes 'circle' or in Cambridge for 
very long). Still, it is probably fair to say that the combination of Robinson's 
combative personal character and the hostile reception of post-Keynesianism 
by the majority of economists did make her a pivotal figure in the emergence 
of post-Keynesianism, and that any history of this emergence ought to ascribe 
to her a key role. Harcourt, however, puts his finger on something probably 
even more important: Robinson, especially in her Accumulation of Capital 
(1956), provided 'a .. vision" of how capitalism works over time and, more 
tentatively, a conceptual framework with which to think about the processes 
involved' (Harcourt 1992: 3). In this respect, she very much was a follower 
of Keynes, who also emphasized the significance of economists' vision of the 
economy: ' Keynes himself (and others on his behalf, notably Joan Robinson) 
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claimed that he tried to change our method of doing economics as well as our 
way of seeing how our economies work' (Harcourt and Sardoni 1994: 132; 
emphasis in original). Thus it is Robinson's particular 'vision' of both the 
operation of the economy as a whole and the way of approaching its 
explanation that we need to attend to in order to understand Harcourt's history 
of the beginnings of post-Keyncsianism. 
That vision matured in The Accumulation of Capital, and combined 
Keynesian thinking about investment, animal spirits and finance with 
Marxian ideas regarding reproduction and realization via Kalecki to create an 
understanding of capitalism as a historical process (Harcourt and King 1995: 
40--2). It was heavily influenced by Sraffa's work on Ricardo and the concept 
of the surplus, and affirmed the distinctiveness of classical political economy. 
Indeed, Harcourt suggests that one of Robinson's virtues was her ability to 
synthesize hers and others' ideas, and that she was less concerned about 
getting credit for things than getting things right. This meant that, at least for 
a time, Robinson's vision reflected the Cambridge, England, view (especially 
for those at Cambridge, Massachusetts), so that telling the history of 
'Robinson and her circle' is simply telling the history of the circle. Much the 
same might be said about the earlier ·cambridge circus' (despite Kahn's 
special role in communicating with Keynes). 
Sadly, the passing of Robinson, Sraffa, Kaldor and Kahn by the mid-1980s 
has left Cambridge with few post-Keynesians, and, lacking a single, 
prominent university location and the notoriety of the original followers of 
Keynes, post-Keynesianism has struck some as less substantial as an 
alternative method and body of economics than it in fact is. Yet not only are 
the number of active post-Keynesians and the range of new developments 
based on the work of 'Robinson and her circle' quite extensive, but post-
Keynesians today are generally aware that they share a distinct tradition in the 
history of economics with specific methodological commitments to a 
historically informed analysis of modern economies. Harcourt's history of 
post-Keynesian origins counts as an important contribution to the develop-
ment of this understanding. 
CONCLUDING NOTE 
Harcourt's claims for Joan Robinson emphasize her vision and capacity as a 
synthesizer of ideas. In this respect he has always very much been her student 
both in having a vision of post-Keynesianism as a distinct and original 
tradition of thought, and in being able to explain the coherence of the range 
of post-Keynesian ideas. These talents, it turns out, are rarer than one might 
suppose, since few others seems to possess them. Indeed. in this respect post-
Keynesianism may find itself in a rather enviable position in that Dobb' s other 
main tradition in economic thought seems to lack a figure comparable in 
talent and insight to Harcourt. 
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NOTES 
1 It is arguable that the decline of Keynesian macroeconomics in later years also 
had its origins in this development, since neoclassical-synthesis Keynesians were 
wedded to aggregate production analysis. New classical macroeconomics is 
based on a fully disaggregated, Walrasian analysis of the economy. 
2 The original papers and later exchange are reprinted in Harcourt (1992: 101-29). 
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